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SEEKING A RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL
CASES IN MARYLAND
Stephen H. Sachs t

Keynote Address given at
The University of Baltimore Law Review
Symposium on April 5, 2007
I.

INTRODUCTION

My thanks to the University of Baltimore Law Review for inviting
me to give the keynote address at this symposium on "Civil
Gideon"-the right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings. I am
particularly pleased to appear with distinguished panelists who
continue to play central roles in the development of this vital issue.
On August 7, 2006, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association (ABA) unanimously approved a groundbreaking
resolution supporting the right to counsel for low income persons in
civil cases impacting basic needs. 1
My fellow panelists and I will undoubtedly be discussing the huge
significance of the ABA resolution in the course of the afternoon. I
want to provide a local context for the discussion by focusing on one
case-Frase v. Barnhart. 2 I do so for several reasons.
First, it is the principal effort, so far, to secure the right here in
Maryland. What better place to discuss it than at this outstanding
school of law?
Second, we came damned close to winning.
Third, it is a chance to sketch our legal theories, some of which are
unique to Maryland.
t

I.

2.

Mr. Sachs is a member of the Maryland Bar; of counsel to Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering,
Hale & DOff; and previously served as United States Attorney for the District of
Maryland (1967-1970) and Attorney General of Maryland (1979-1987). He argued
the case of Frase v. Barnhardt, 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003), in the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. He delivered this keynote address, which has been slightly
edited and annotated for publication, at the University of Baltimore's inaugural
symposium on AprilS, 2007.
See American Bar Association Task Force on Access to Civil Justice, ABA
Resolution on Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 507, available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sc1aid/downloads/06A 112A.pdf.
379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003).
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And fourth, but most important, it is a chance to introduce you to
Deborah Frase, to put a human face on a cause that is not mere
theory ... to try to convey what it is like-in the alien world of the
law-to face the loss of your child-alone-without "the guiding
hand of counsel." 3
II.

THE FRASE CASE

My co-counsel and I represented Deborah Frase, the appellant in
Frase v. Barnhart, 4 a child custody case decided by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in December, 2003. 5 Deborah Frase won. 6
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because she was a fit
parent, it was error for the lower court to condition her continued
custody of her two-year-old son on bi-weekly visitation at the home
of the custody-seeking Barnharts; and on her application to a
transitional shelter; and on continued review hearings before a
judicial master. 7
The court's ruling was based on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Troxel v. Granville, 8 a grandparent visitation case, which
established the constitutionally mandated presumption that a fit
parent knows best what is in the child's best interest. 9 A four-judge
majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not reach our
contention that Ms. Frase had been entitled to court-appointed
counsel. They said that the issue had become moot. 10 Three judges
concurred in the majority's disposition of the custody issue, but
would have reached the right to counsel issue. II Moreover, they
would have held that Ms. Frase was constitutionally entitled to
appointed counsel. 12
We were, of course, delighted that our client won her case and
heartened by the concurring opinion. But I was left with the feeling
that with respect to our cherished right to counsel issue, we had
tossed up an appellate air ball.

***
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 u.s. 335, 345 (1963).
Frase, 379 Md. at 102,840 A.2d at 115.
Id. at 100,840 A.2d at 114.
Id. at 128-29,840 A.2d at 131.
/d. at 121-22, 125,840 A.2d at 126, 128-29.
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
See id. at 63.
See Frase, 379 Md. at 103,840 A.2d at 115.
See id. at 129,840 A.2d at 131 (Cathell, J., concurring).
/d. at 141,840 A.2d at 138.
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I admire Deborah Frase. She is in a class with some of my other
heroines-like the real Karen Silkwood 13 and the fictional Norma
Rae. 14
When Deb Frase, then 29 and a resident of Caroline County,
Maryland, was arrested on a year-old bench warrant for possession
and intent to distribute three ounces of marijuana, her mother, Diane
Keys, who was a traveling nurse-and with whom Deb had an
extraordinarily contentious relationship--ignored Deb's instructions.
She placed Deb's youngest son, two-year-old Brett Michael, with
Cynthia and Curtis Barnhart, whose only relationship with the Frase
family was that Curtis was the leader of the Boy Scout troop of which
Deb's oldest child was a member. 15
Deb Frase pled guilty to the marijuana charge and was sentenced
by Talbot County circuit court judge William Home to time servedeight weeks. 16 Upon release, she retrieved Brett Michael, but the
Barnharts-who had known Brett Michael for all of six weeksimmediately filed a complaint for custody. They were represented by
retained counsel. Deb Frase could not afford counsel. Although
financially eligible, she was turned down by various legal services
programs because they were understaffed and overworked. 17 She
requested appointment of counsel at least four times, in vain, during
the proceedings below. 18
In two days of hearings before the judicial master in Caroline
County, Deb Frase hung tough. She called witnesses from social
service agencies, all of whom testified that she was a loving and fit
mother, and that the trailer in which she was living, while crowded,
was clean and safe. 19 The Barnharts, aided immeasurably by the
hostile testimony of Deb's mother, focused on Deb's troubled past,
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

Karen Silkwood, played by Meryl Streep in the biographical film Silkwood, was a
union activist and whistle blower known for her efforts in investigating and exposing
the appalling health and safety standards at her place of employment, the KerrMcGee Nuclear Corporation, in the Kerr-McGee Plutonium Case. See generally
RICHARD RASHKE, THE KILLING OF KAREN SILKWOOD: THE STORY BEHIND THE KERRMCGEE PLUTONIUM CASE (1981); see also SILKWOOD (Twentieth Century Fox 1983).
Norma Rae is a movie heroine, played by Sally Field, who leads the effort to
unionize the textile mill where she works. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The
Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the American Labor Movement Depends
on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089, 1105 n.82 (1999).
Joint Record Extract at E0050-51, E0069-72, E0136, E0190-91, Frase v. Barnhart,
379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003) (No.6).
Id. at E050-51.
See Frase, 379 Md. at 105,840 A.2d at 116-17.
Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at E0400, E0419, E0423, E0436.
Id. at E0094, E0097, EOIOO-OI, EOI03, E0224-25, E0230, E0245, E0247.
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her earlier bouts with drugs and alcohol, some minor scrapes with the
law, and her lousy parenting of her oldest son during her teenage
years. 20
I must point out here that nine years earlier, Deb Frase consented to
relinquish legal custody of that oldest son, then her only child, to her
mother.2l The court file in that proceeding reveals that Ms. Keys, the
mother, made the same allegations then that she was now making
before the master-<irugs, alcohol, and bad parenting. 22 The court
file also reveals that Ms. Keys's attorney in the earlier matter was the
same master now adjudicating Deb's case!23 But, neither the master
nor Ms. Keys, or even the counsel for the Barnharts disclosed that
fact. Deb Frase was ignorant of this and didn't discover it until she
examined the earlier court file for the first time after the hearing
before the master and the circuit court hearing on her exceptions.
Deb Frase testified that she had made, as she put it, some "bad
choices" earlier in her life, but asserted she was recovering and
responsl'bl e now. 24
The hearing before the master was a parody of the adversary
process.
She conducted no pretrial discovery and didn't know she could.
Her attempts at research in the Denton's courthouse library didn't
lead her to the dispositive Troxel case until after all the hearings were
over. She cited it for the first time in a final, desperate pleading-an
emergency motion occasioned by her belated discovery of the
master's previous representation of her mother. 25
She had no understanding of how to introduce evidence or what an
expert witness was.
She frequently expressed bewilderment and apologized for it.
Her cross examination of her mother-the central witness against
her-was in shambles and amounted to little more than an exchange
of accusations. 26
She was never able to challenge the posture of the Barnharts as
Good Samaritans who, in a mere six weeks, had purportedly
established a loving and warm relationship with Brett Michael. She
was also unable to question their motives; the reason for the plethora
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
2S.
26.

Brief of Appellant at 31, Frase, 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (No.6).
Id.at3.
Id. at IS.
See, e.g., Joint Record Extract, supra note IS, at E043S.
Id. at E0268. It is worthy of note that Deb had been abused by her father over a sixmonth period when she was a teenager; he committed suicide shortly thereafter.
Id. at E0434-3S.
Id. at EOI46-S9.
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of biological, foster, and adopted children who choked their home; or
the living conditions in their home, all of which begged for testing.
Hearsay was rampant and was admitted without objection.27 Her
direct testimony was little more than a response to cursory questions
from the master. 28
At root, Deb Frase was never able to overcome the shadow that her
admittedly troubled past cast on her present parenting abilities. She
was never able to achieve, as any trained advocate would have, a
coherent presentation distinguishing fact from supposition and
prejudice or demonstrating a change over the decade from then to
now.
Although the master found, as the evidence compelled, that Deb
Frase was, at present, a fit parent and denied the Barnharts' custody
request, she nonetheless recommended the restrictive custodial
conditions I have mentioned. 29 Her report, moreover, made explicit
her deep distrust of Deb, her scornful prediction that Deb would fail
as a parent, and her regret that the law did not allow her to award
custody to the Barnharts. 3o
Deb Frase fared no better before the circuit court. The judge-who
took no testimony, listened to no tapes, and read no transcriptessentially adopted the master's report. 31 She expressed gratitude
that the Barnharts "were there as a safety net for [her] family.,,32
And she turned the Troxel constitutional presumption on its head,
saying "unless you can tell me something about the Barnharts that
would suggest that they wouldn't be adequate supervisors, it's falling
on deaf ears.,,33
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland majority reversed, as
I have said, on Troxel grounds. It didn't reach the recusal issue, but
27.

IdatE0032,E0040, E0042.

28.

See generally Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Master's Hearing,
Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for Caroline County, Md. May 20, 2002),
reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at E0076-82.
Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 106,840 A.2d 114, 117 (2003); see also Report and
Recommendation of Master, Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for Caroline
County, Md. June 4, 2002), reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at
E0398-99.
Report and Recommendation of Master, supra note 29, at E0398.
Frase, 379 Md. at 106, 840 A.2d at 117; see also Reporter's Official Transcript of
Proceedings, Hearing on Exceptions, Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for
Caroline County, Md. Sept. 13, 2002), reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note
15, at E0321-23.
Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Exceptions, supra note 31,
at E0342.

29.

30.
31.

32.

33.

ld
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sent a strong message to the master to review her ethical obligations.
The right to counsel issue was, of course, entirely moot as to Deb
Frase, and the court majority was unwilling to use this occasion to
give right to counsel guidance to others similarly situated. It was this
decision to not decide that Judge Cathell's concurrence, joined in by
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge, protested. 34
In any case, there is no Civil Gideon in Maryland. At least ... not
yet.

***
"Gideon," of course refers to Gideon v. Wainwright,35 the 1963
case in which Clarence Earl Gideon, prisoner number 003826 in the
Florida State Prison, whose handwritteI) petition to the Supreme
Court saying he should have had appointed counsel in his trial for
petty larceny, led to one ofthe defining moments in our constitutional
history.
Gideon held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, through its incorporation of the Sixth Amendment,
required the ap~ointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants
in state courts. 6 Justice Black's "moving words," drawn largely
from the language of the old Scottsboro case, remain the hymn-the
old time religion-for those of us who would apply the logic of
Gideon to civil litigation:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of the law .... He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence .... He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him .... 37
"This seems to us to be an obvious truth," Justice Black wrote, that
"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. ,,38 In such
circumstances, "lawyers," he wrote, "are necessities, not luxuries.,,39
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Frase, 379 Md. at 129-30,840 A.2d at 131 (Cathell, J., concurring).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68--69 (1932)).
Id. at 344.
Id.
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Alas, eighteen years later, the Supreme Court decided Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services,4o which held that a North Carolina
mother fighting the State of North Carolina's effort to terminate her
parental rights was not entitled to an appointed counsel. 41 A five-tofour majority of the Court tied Gideon to its Sixth Amendment
moorings and erected a presumption that an indigent civil litigant has
a right to appointed counsel only when, if she loses, she may be
deprived of her physical liberty."2 The presumption is rebuttable
only after applying a restrictive balancing test on a case-by-case
basis.
What to do? To repair to state constitutions, that's what. In
particular to the Constitution of Maryland, which is older and better
than the one those Framers wrote in Philadelphia in 1787.

***
III. A FEW OBVIOUS PROPOSITIONS
Before I get to the doctrine, I want to set out a few unremarkableand I think incontestable-propositions that give practical
significance and importance to the state constitutional doctrines on
which I rely.
First, a lawyer is a pretty important thing to have in litigation.
That's why people who can afford them usually hire them.
Lawyers make a difference. It is worth recalling that the second
time around, after Clarence Earl Gideon got his court appointed
lawyer, he was acquitted. 43
That's why the presence of counsel in Maryland's administrative
proceedings, for example, doubles claimants' success rates in
overturning agency decisions.
That's why battered women who had an attorney were successful in
getting a protective order 83% of the time, while only 32% of
battered women without an attorney obtained an order. 44
That's why judges are required to be scrupulous in making sure
that waivers oflawyers in criminal cases are voluntary.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

452 U.S. 18 (1981).
[d. at 31. This was not an ideal test case. Ms. Lassiter was in prison for double
murder at the time and had no significant track record for motherly love. [d. at 18.
[d. at 26-27.
ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 249 (1964).
Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 250-51 (2003).
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And that's why, on the forms published by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland's Administrative Office of the Courts, pro se litigants in
contested custody cases like Deb Frase's are warned that they need a
lawyer if the other side has one and are "urged to consider carefully
the importance of getting an attorney to help you. Custody, if
contested, is one of the most difficult types of cases and you should
consider seriously using an attorney.,,45
IV. THE DOCTRINE
We Civil Gideon advocates argue that the Constitution of Maryland
mandates appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants, at least
in cases, like Deborah Frase's, that touch fundamental rights and
basic human needs.
Over a hundred years ago, a Yale Law Journal article about
Maryland constitutional law observed that one of the axioms of our
constitutional history is "[t]hat the colonists carried with them the
rights of Englishmen, when they crossed the Atlantic .... ,,46 Indeed,
some of the provisions we rely on reach back to Tudor England and,
earlier still, to Magna Carta. In short, the right of an indigent civil
litigant. to appointed counsel is a right that has deep roots in
Maryland's constitutional soil.
A.

Article XIX

I want to begin by discussing Article XIX of our Declaration of
Rights. Article XIX provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person
or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law
of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without
delay, according to the Law of the land. 47
It flows directly, with some cadenzas by Lord Coke and Blackstone,
from Magna Carta's chapter 40: "To no one will we sell, to no one
will we refuse or delay, right or justice,,,48 which was written to
reform the sale of writs, documents that opened access to the courts,
45.

INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING A COMPLAINT FOR CUSTODY I (rev. ed. 2005),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/forms/drin04.pdf (this is a commonly used civil

46.
47.
48.

domestic case information report).
Bernard C. Steiner, The Adoption of English Law in Maryland, 8 YALE L.J. 353, 353
(1899).
MD. CON ST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XIX.
MAGNA CARTA ch. 40, reprinted in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914).

20071
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during the reigns of Henry II and good King John, and has been
interpreted "as a universal guarantee of impartial justice to high and
low .... ,,49 Blackstone wrote of Magna Carta's guarantee of access
to the courts. 50 As Professor Howard has put it, Magna Carta
mandated that "justice is not something to be sold to the highest
bidder but should be available on impartial terms to men of all
ranks.,,51
Magna Carta has become the template for the so-called "open
courts," "access to courts," and "remedies" provisions like Article
XIX, which has counterparts in about forty other states. 52
Significantly, it has no counterpart in the federal constitution. Most
of the jurisprudence under these proVISIons concerns the
reasonableness of legislation that limits access to the courts in some
way-legislation, for example, requiring arbitration of medical
malpractice claims, statutes of limitations, and repose.
True, no court has found, so far, that open courts provisions
mandate appointment of counsel for the indigent civil litigant. Nor,
to my knowledge, has any state court yet directly addressed the issue.
But, we argue, the promise of access to the courts-in the most
litigious society on the face of the earth-is meaningless unless it
contemplates access with counsel.
This is not a startling proposition.
We remember that warning on the forms that were provided to pro
se litigants by our own Administrative Office of the Courts.
We have been reminded by the Maryland Commission on Pro Bono
(the Cardin Commission) that "[m]any of Maryland's poor lack
meaningful access to the civil justice system because they cannot
afford a lawyer.,,53
.
We agree with Justice Black, who observed that in the civil
context, "there cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process
until every serious litigant is represented by competent counsel. ,,54

49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.

MCKECHNIE, supra note 48, at 398.
See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765-69) ("[ c]ourts of justice must at all times be open to
the subject .... ") (alteration of original).
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY IS (1964).
John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of
State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237,237-38 (1991).
THE MARYLAND JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON PRO BONO: REpORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS vi (2000), http://www.courts.state.md.us/probono.pdf.
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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We agree with Judge Robert Sweet of the Southern District of New
York: "[W]e need a civil Gideon-that is, an expanded constitutional
right to counsel in civil matters."ss
We can appreciate the caustic observation of California's Justice
Earl Johnson who wrote that saying that mere physical presence in
the courtroom is "access" is like saying that earl~ Christians being
thrown to the lions had "access" to the Colosseum. 6
In short, the logic that supports the holding of Gideon-that the
right to be heard means little without the right to be heard by counsel,
and that lawyers are necessities, not luxuries-is often as applicable
to civil cases as it is to criminal ones. Fairness is not a function of
the label on the proceedings. A trial is either fair or not. Gideon's
doctrine may not support the civil right, but its logic sure does.
Deborah Frase, like Clarence Gideon, had no skill "in the science
of law,,,s7 she, like Gideon, was unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence; faced with the need to interview and examine witnesses, to
assess relevance, to advocate controlling le~al issues she, like
Gideon, needed "the guiding hand of counsel."s It is of no practical
consequence that an assistant state's attorney was not her opponent;
she faced a trained practitioner who made his living in the very courts
in which she was an alien. And the stakes? It seems to me
incontestable that the threatened loss of a child is an incomparably
greater life shattering event than thirty days for shoplifting.
To put this in historic context, perhaps we should say that Deb
Frase's inability to get a lawyer, and the inability of thousands of the
poor in Maryland's courtrooms every day, hurting as badly as she and
frequently worse, is the twenty-first century equivalent of being
unable to buy a writ.
In short, Article XIX's promise of access cannot be fulfilled and
cannot be redeemed, in many civil cases, without the appointment of
counsel for the indigent civil litigant.
There is a second aspect of Article XIX's provenance that should
be underscored and supports our contention that appointed counsel
for the poor is essential to give it meaning.
Article XIX, and the Magna Carta provision from which it grew, is
not only about unobstructed access to courts by private citizens.

55.

Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 503, 503 (1998).

56.
57.
58.

Earl Johnson, Jr., Thrown to the Lions: A Plea for a Constitutional Right to Counsel
for Low-Income Civil Litigants, BAR LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 17.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
!d.
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It is also a statement of judicial independence, judicial power and,
uniquely, judicial responsibility. It is judiciary centered. As the
highest court of another state has said of its counterpart to
Maryland's Article XIX: it was "directed at the courtS."S9 As many
commentators and courts have pointed out, these "open courts,"
"access," or "remedy clauses," rooted in Magna Carta and especially
those cadenzas of Coke and Blackstone, were precursors of the then
infant idea of separation of powers, captured in Article VIII of our
Declaration of Rights, and of an independent judiciary. 60
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has "been there," so to speak,
before, nearly thirty years ago, in its searching discussion of the
judicial function and judicial independence in Attorney General v.
Waldron. 61 It's a case that I believe bears directly on the power of
Maryland's courts to appoint counsel, and their responsibility to do
so, in order to fulfill the unfulfilled promise of access of Article
XIX. 62
In Waldron, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the
General Assembly's effort to prevent retired judges from practicing
law if they accepted judicial pensions was an unconstitutional attempt
by the legislature to regulate the legal profession, which the court
held was the province of the judiciary under Article VIII. 63 It is
instructive to examine the court's reasoning.
It asserted that each branch of government possessed powers
implied "from the right and obligation to perform its constitutional
duties. ,,64
It spoke of the courts' "constitutionall~ imposed responsibility with
respect to the administration of justice." 5
It asserted flatly that the judicial branch had an obligation "to
monitor and manage its own house.,,66 In a passage that inescapably
speaks to the issues raised in a right to appointed counsel claim,
Judge J. Dudley Digges explained the "unique relationship" between

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 492 (Mont. 1989).
MD. CaNST. DECL. OF RTS. art. Vlll; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 69; Jonathan
M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of
State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279, 1312(1995).
289 Md. 683, 688-89, 695, 426 A.2d 929, 933, 936 (1981).
See MD. CaNST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XIX.
Waldron, 289 Md. at 690--92, 697-98, 728-29,426 A.2d at 933-35,937,954.
Id. at 690, 426 A.2d at 933-34.
Id. at 692, 426 A.2d at 934.
Id. at 695, 426 A.2d at 936.
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bar and bench 67 and the need for effective lawyering to make the
adversary system work:
In this country, it is a well known maxim that attorneys
function as officers of the courts, and, as such, are a
necessary and important adjunct to the administration of
justice. This truism necessarily derives, in our view, from
the very theory of the structure of our system of justice.

The adversary process integral to the design of our
dispute-resolving scheme is perhaps one of the more
remarkable accomplishments of western jurisprudence. It is
this process, whereby truth is garnered from the articulation
of opposing points of view, that is the preeminent tool
through which fairness is achieved in the administration of
justice in this country.

Without a vigorous, honorable and qualified bar, the
judiciary of this State, to put it quite simply, would be
greatly handicapped if not comRletely incapable of
performing those duties assigned to it. 68
True, there is nothing in the Waldron holding that directly
addresses the issue of appointment of counsel for the indigent. 69
And Waldron is not, strictly speaking, an Article XIX case. 70
But Waldron focused on the key role of lawyers in making the
adversary system effective and, above all, stressed the ~ower and the
responsibility of the judiciary to manage its own house. I
Waldron, thus, is very strong support for my contention that
Maryland courts should interpret Article XIX to require appointment
of counsel for indigent civil litigants, at least in basic needs cases, in
order to discharge their responsibility to make the adversary system
function properly. 72

67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

ld.
ld. at 695-96, 426 A.2d at 936-37 (emphasis added).
See id. at 684, 426 A.2d at 931 (addressing specifically only the issues of whether a
statute prohibiting a former judge from practicing law for compensation violates
separation of powers and whether that same statute itself violates separation of
powers).
See id.
Id. at 695, 426 A.2d at 936.
See id. at 695-96, 426 A.2d at 936-37.
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ARTICLE V

The most explicit recognition of the indigent's right to appointed
counsel stems from Article V of the Declaration of Rights, which
provides in relevant part:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
Common Law of England ... and to the benefit of such of
the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July,
[1776]; and which, by experience, have been found
applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have
been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or
Equity. .. subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. 73
Among those "rights of Englishmen" was the Tudor statute 11 Hen.
VII, ch. 12, which established a right to appointed counsel for
indigent civil plaintiffs with meritorious causes of action. 74 Its
purpose was to ensure that those indigent civil litigants, who would
have been unable to navigate the baroque writ system without
assistance, had access to the King's courts. The Hen. VII statute
commands that:
Indifferent Justice to be had ... as well to the poor as to the
rich. . . of it be afore the King in his Bench, the Justices
there shall assign to the same poor person or persons
Counsel learned by their discretions which shall give their
Counselees nothing taking for the same, and in like wise ...
shall appoint attorney and attorneys for the same poor
person and persons ... which shall do their duties without
any rewards for their Counselees help and business in the
same .... 75
Under 11 Hen. VII the chancellor merely determined whether a
party was indigent; whether he would swear himself worth less than
five pounds. 76 Once the chancellor determined that the party was
indigent, the statute required the appointment of counsel.
73.
74.
75.

76.

MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. V(a).
Michael Milleman, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18,42-43 (1990).
II HEN. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816),
microformed on Microcard No. 55E53 (Matthew Bender & Co.) (alteration of
original) (emphasis added).
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765-69).
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The Hen. VII statute was incorporated as part of the common law
of Maryland. This we know because Chancellor Kilty tells us so. In
1809 the General Assembly asked William Kilty, then chancellor of
Maryland (and a brooding omnipresence who hovers over Maryland
legal history) to inform it which English statutes were proper to be
incorporated into Maryland law. Among those· statutes that Kilty
found had been introduced, used, and practiced in the Maryland
colony, and applicable to Maryland's circumstances was the Hen. VII
statute. 77
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has frequently
addressed Kilty's findings concerning the incorporation of English
statutes pursuant to Article V, it has never rejected such a finding.
And, the General Assembly has never revised, amended or repealed
the Hen. VII statute.
Kilty was not called upon to opine on what aspects of the English
common law were incorporated via Article V. But as the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has held, "the mass of the common law as it
existed in England" at the American Revolution, unless it was
inconsistent with our institutions, was also incorporated by Article
V. 78 And it is clear from at least a dozen old English cases that the
right to appointed counsel was recognized by English common law
even prior to the Tudor statute, and that the right extended to
defendants who were paupers as well as plaintiffs. 79
Legitimate questions arise about the applicability of the Hen. VII
statute. Where has it been all these years? Can the legislature really
repeal it? Does it apply to defendants as well as plaintiffs? How on
earth can we apply the "five pounds and the clothes on your back"
test to the twenty-first century? These important issues, and others,
deserve consideration. We can expect that when the Court of
Appeals of Maryland eventually addresses the aFoplicability of the
Hen. VII statute, they will be thoroughly explored. 0

77.

78.

79.
80.

A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST
EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, AND WHICH BY EXPERIENCE HAVE BEEN
FOUND APPLICABLE TO THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES; AND OF SUCH
OTHERS AS HAVE SINCE BEEN MADE IN ENGLAND OR GREAT-BRITAIN, AND HAVE BEEN
INTRODUCED, USED AND PRACTISED, BY THE COURTS OF LAW OR EQUITY; AND ALSO
ALL SUCH PARTS OF THE SAME AS MAY BE PROPER TO BE INTRODUCED AND
INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE 229 (1811)
[hereinafter A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES]'
Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974).
See, e.g., Wiat v. Farthing, 84 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1668).
These issues are addressed and relevant authorities are collected in Brief of
Appellant, supra note 20, at 33-42.
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Article XXIV

Article XXIV provides in relevant part, "That no man ought to
be ... deprived of his life, liberty or rroperty, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." 1
Article XXIV is Maryland's guarantee of due process, which
ensures a fair hearing. Many believe that, while the Supreme Court's
Lassiter decision is' our law of the land, Article XXIV is not as
reliable as support for a Maryland Civil Gideon as are Articles XIX
and V. But, several supportive features concerning Article XXIV are
relevant.
First, while it is true that Article XXIV is to be construed in pari
materia with its federal counterpart and is thus subject to the
restrictive case-by-case balancing test of Lassiter, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has recently reminded us that in pari materia
does not require Maryland to slavishly follow every interpretation of
the federal provisions by the Supreme Court. 82
Second, the interpretation of Article XXIV to include the right to
appointed counsel for the poor in civil cases involving fundamental
rights or human needs, draws additional support from those
companion Declaration of Rights provisions, Articles XIX and V,
which, as we have seen, have no counterpart in the federal
constitution. The provenance of these three provisions is nearly
identical. They were written by drafters schooled on the works of
Coke and Blackstone, who also knew, as Kilty observed, that
appointed counsel for the poor was "being [used and] practi[ c]ed" in
the Maryland colony. 83 The drafters of Article XXIV had plenty of
reason to believe that the Law of the land, at least in Maryland,
incorporated a right to appointed civil counsel for the poor.

***
V. CONCLUSION
So where do we Marylanders stand? We continue to search for the
best test case, "Frase II." Meanwhile, several judges of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, including Chief Judge Bell, have indicated
judicial approval of some form of the right. 84 But it seems
81.
82.
83.
84.

Mo, CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XXIV.
See, e.g., Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071(2002).
A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES, supra note 77, at 229.
See, e.g., Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 687-89, 907 A.2d 807, "827-28
(2006) (Bell, c.J., dissenting) (supporting the right of low-income people to counsel
at public expense in adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake).
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appropriate to give the last word today to Judge Cathell, author of an
eloquent concurring opinion in Frase:
[T]his issue will not go away. . .. This issue will keep
coming back. .. until four judges of this Court vote to
resolve it one way or the other. The bullet will have to be
bitten .... The poor need a yes or a no.
I am fully aware of the consequences of taking the first
step onto the path of a civil Gideon. But the right we are
asked to afford in the context of this case, addresses the
most fundamental of rights. It is not in the nature of a
speeding ticket, a civil violation of a zoning ordinance, a
tortious interference with contract, or a breach of contract
case. In my view, it is much more fundamental, much more
important. It is in the nature of the protection of the family.
What can be more important? We should all try to imagine
how it must feel to be utterly poor and to receive a summons
from the hands of a sheriff informing us that we are required
to appear in court because either the State or some third
party is attempting to terminate our paternal rights, or to
interfere with them, and we don't have any money with
which to hire a lawyer. The poor face fears without the
security of the money that many others have. And it can be
terrifying, to realize how helpless you are when others are
attempting to take your children from you. 85

85.

Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 140-41, 840 A.2d 114, 138 (2003) (Cathell, J.,
concurring).

